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Rapport in het kort 
Scenario’s voor post-2012 klimaatbeleid  
De ontwikkeling van een toekomstig internationaal klimaatbeleid is met vele onzekerheden 
omgeven. Dit rapport concentreert zich op de onzekerheid ten aanzien van het klimaatbeleid 
dat door andere landen mogelijk gevoerd zal worden. Deze context speelt een grote rol 
binnen de Nederlandse beleidsdiscussie. De beleidsopgave is immers een wereldwijde en de 
beleidsopties zijn dus sterk afhankelijk van de beleidsinspanningen van andere landen. Met 
vier verschillende scenario’s schetst dit rapport alternatieve toekomstbeelden. De vier 
scenario’s onderscheiden zich aan de hand van twee dimensies: de urgentie waarmee tegen 
het klimaatprobleem wordt aangekeken en de bereidheid die landen tonen om gezamenlijk 
aan een oplossing te werken. Samen vormen ze mogelijke, uiteenlopende ontwikkelingen in 
de beleidsomgeving van de EU die relevant zijn bij het identificeren van een robuuste keuze 
voor opties op het terrein van het klimaatbeleid voor Nederland en de EU. De 
scenarioanalyses laten zien dat alleen als alle belangrijke landen al vóór 2020 actief 
betrokken worden bij het reduceren van hun broeikasgasemissies, er substantiële reducties 
van broeikasgas emissies kunnen worden gehaald. Alleen dan is er een gerede kans op het 
halen van de 2 graden Celsius temperatuurdoelstelling van de EU. Bij kleinere 
samenwerkingsverbanden met minder strikte reductiedoelstellingen, stijgen de kosten voor de 
deelnemers aan een coalitie, terwijl de milieueffectiviteit afneemt. 
 
Trefwoorden: klimaatverandering, klimaatbeleid, scenario’s, cap-and-trade, broeikasgas 
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Summary 
Many uncertainties are involved in the shaping of post-2012 climate policies. Of these this 
report focuses on the uncertainties with respect to the climate policies that may be 
implemented in other countries. These are predominantly important in the climate policy 
discussion as the policy question is a global one, whence national policy options crucially 
depend on the policy efforts of other countries. With four alternative scenarios this report 
sketches possible, alternative developments in the climate policy domain. These four 
scenarios are characterised by two dimensions: the sense of urgency expressed by the policy 
goal, and the willingness to resolve the climate problem through concerted action. Together 
these provide a background that is thought to be relevant for identifying the best mitigation 
options to reduce future greenhouse gas emissions, both in the Netherlands and the EU, in 
alternative future states of the climate policy domain. The analysis shows that only if all 
major countries become actively involved in emissions abatement before 2020, the 
substantial long-term greenhouse gas emissions reductions can be achieved that are needed to 
meet the EU climate target of limiting the global temperature increase to 2
oC in this century. 
If coalitions become smaller and reduction targets less binding, the costs to coalition 
members and the environmental ineffectiveness tend to increase. 
 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 7 of 37 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 
The climate problem is full of uncertainties. These uncertainties are present in assessing the 
expected rise in temperature due to increased concentrations of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere, in assessing the consequences of rising temperatures for both the economy and 
the environment and in the phasing, timing and intensity of measures that will be aimed at 
mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. Uncertainties surrounding the climate policies that may 
be implemented in other countries predominantly affect the climate policy discussion: the 
policy question is a global one, and therefore national policy options greatly depend on the 
policy efforts of other countries. It is not possible to foresee which measures will be taken by 
the non-EU countries, both in the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol (2008-
2012) and the years thereafter. It therefore seems sensible to show a number of alternative 
scenarios of future developments that together provide a background allowing policy makers 
to assess the effectiveness of the mitigation options available.  
          
This report aims to provide further information on these scenarios, to briefly describe the 
outcomes for the year 2020, and to indicate the extent to which the EU long-term climate 
target of 2°C above pre-industrial levels can be achieved. 
 
Scenarios are – at their level of aggregation – feasible, internally consistent representations of 
the future. They are not predictions, but simply provide alternative future developments that – 
from today’s point of view – have similar chances to materialise. Since the emphasis lies on 
exploring globally diverging climate policy situations, this report distinguishes these 
scenarios along two dimensions: the extent of urgency expressed by the policy measures, and 
the willingness to resolve the climate problem through international collaboration – 
unilaterally or multilaterally. In principle, four scenarios are defined by these two 
distinguishing dimensions. The following figure indicates these dimensions and the positions 
of the scenarios. Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 8 of 37 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Positioning of the scenarios according to ambition and international collaboration 
 
GRAND COALITION and IMPASSE diagonally oppose each other. In the former scenario the 
seriousness of the situation is widely recognized and there is a considerable willingness to 
collaborate internationally towards a solution. As a result, effective international agreements 
are made between a large number of countries. The latter scenario shows what would happen 
if many countries and regions fail to see the need to contribute towards climate policy. This 
would result in no collective policy measures being pursued and ineffective policies being 
implemented. There is insufficient political will for collaborative international agreements, 
and the countries that do implement policies do not show great ambitions, in the knowledge 
that strict policy measures will make very little difference, but will impose high abatement 
costs. 
 
The scenarios FRAGMENTED and LARGEST COMMON DENOMINATOR are also diagonally 
opposing each other. The former scenario generally accepts that climate change is a serious 
problem, but countries cannot agree on the priority that should be given to address this 
problem. For example, the USA sees the security of energy supplies as an equally important 
problem. Partly as a result of priority differences between countries, the will and the 
opportunities to work together are also limited. This creates a broad, multicoloured palette of 
policy measures without international collaboration. On average, LARGEST COMMON 
DENOMINATOR shows little urgency, but there is some consensus on the targets for 
international climate policy that still remain. This scenario shows countries working together, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 9 of 37 
 
but none of them is willing to take the lead. The result is that international agreements are set 
at the level of the least ambitious country: the LARGEST COMMON DENOMINATOR. 
 
All four scenarios have been simulated up to the year 2020, against the background of a 
baseline up to the year 2100. This baseline scenario does not include climate policy. The 
WorldScan model is used to sketch the economic implications (in 2020) of the climate 
policies deployed, and the associated emission reductions in terms of fossil CO2. The 
assessed costs pertain to the costs of reducing fossil CO2 emissions. Adaptation costs and the 
economic damages caused by climate change are not included. The models IMAGE, TIMER 
and FAIR indicate the climate implications of greenhouse gas concentrations in the longer 
term, and thus the probability of achieving the 2°C target. With this approach this study 
establishes trade-offs between the 2020 costs of reducing emissions on the one hand and the 
likelihood of meeting the EU temperature target by 2100 on the other hand. Though the time 
horizon of the scenario’s that are simulated with WorldScan is 2020, the assessment of the 
mean global rise in temperature is based on numerous simluations of similar scenario’s until 
2100 with IMAGE, TIMER and FAIR. Appendix A briefly describes the main characteristics 
of the models used, and their common baseline scenario.  Section 2 describes the assumptions 
for the international and national climate policies incorporated in the four scenarios, and the 
consequences of these for the economy, CO2 emissions and the likelihood of achieving the 
2°C target. The last section concludes and discusses several aspects that are relevant to the 
policy discussion. 
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2  Description of the scenarios 
2.1  Grand Coalition 
This scenario forms the ‘ideal’ future climate policy that is the target of international 
negotiations by the Netherlands and the EU. The negotiations succeed in forming a GRAND 
COALITION that includes not just the Annex I countries, but also large, fast-growing 
developing countries such as China, India and Brazil. A new climate mitigation regime 
follows the so-called ‘multi-stage approach’ (Den Elzen et al., 2006), and stipulates specific 
efforts such that the 2°C target is expected to remain feasible. The level of development and 
emissions per capita of the various participating countries determine the extent of the 
mitigation efforts and the type of commitment (absolute, relative or no commitment at all). 
Emissions of the least-developed countries are therefore not restricted, but more advanced 
developing countries must commit themselves to relative targets. The Annex I countries 
accept absolute emissions reduction targets. 
 
The costs of significant emissions reductions remain limited because emissions trading is 
used on a large scale. Not just the countries with absolute targets (Annex I), but also the 
nations with relative targets (China, India and Brazil) use emissions trading, at least for the 
energy-intensive sectors. Using the opportunities of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) is an option in countries with no restrictions on emissions. But since the greatest 
potential for relatively inexpensive mitigation options is in the fast-developing countries and 
can be reached via emissions trading, CDM plays only a minor role. 
 
This scenario is quantified as follows. Annex I countries have post-2012 emission targets that 
gradually lead to overall reductions of fossil CO2 emissions by 20% compared to 1990 levels 
in the year 2020. For the allocation of emission reductions to individual Annex I countries, 
the per capita emission levels are taken into account, and therefore the countries with the 
highest emissions per head will face relatively large reduction targets (see Appendix A). In 
the long term this leads to a convergence in the per capita emission allowances. From 2011 
onwards Latin America, the Middle East and China will reduce their annual emissions by 1% 
compared to the baseline scenario, while the annual relative reduction for India will be 0,5%. 
All emission allowances can be traded. The rest of the world has no reduction commitment 
and de facto does not contribute via CDM either. On a modest scale, financial resources for 
adaptation will become available through a tax of 0.1 €/tCO2 on emission allowance imports 
by Annex I countries. These resources are transferred to non-Annex I countries in proportion 
to the size of their population. Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 11 of 37 
 
 Table  2.1  GRAND COALITION, 2020 
 Percentage  CO2 reduction  Emission price  National income
 
Target  (actually 
in 2020) 









emissions 2020  




Annex I   -20 -34 -19 24 -0.3
    EU-25  -23 -38 -15 24 -0.4
    USA  -24 -47 -20 24 -0.3
    Former Soviet Union   -13 7 -22 24 0.8
    Rest of OECD  -16 -39 -18 24 -0.4
Non-Annex I  (100) -- -23 -- 0.0
    China  101 -10 -45 24 0.4
    India  210 -5 -30 24 0.1
World  (28) -- -21 -- -0.2
 Source:  WorldScan 
 
 
Under these quantitative assumptions world emissions in 2020 will have risen by 28% 
compared to 1990 levels (see Table 2.1). This falls just within the emissions envelope for 
stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-eq., that is considered to be 
compatible with meeting the 2°C target with a high probability (see section 2.5). The table 
also shows that the majority of the Annex I countries are importing emission allowances, 
both from the Former Soviet Union and non-Annex I countries. As a result of permit 
tradability the emission price amounts to 24 €/tCO2 in 2020 under the GRAND COALITION 
scenario. Annex I countries experience an average welfare loss of 0.3% in terms of national 
income. Russia achieves a welfare increase of 0.8% by selling emission allowances, under a 
non-restrictive emission target. The improved welfare for non-Annex I countries is generally 
modest, although China increases its national income by 0.4% by the export of emission 
permits. 
 
In general, GRAND COALITION clearly shows that international collaboration is cost effective: 
the -20% target for Annex I countries is achieved in 2020 with relatively minor changes in 
economic welfare. In addition, the scenario is also effective from the environmental point of 
view as it is likely to meet the 2°C target with sufficient probability (see section 2.5). Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 12 of 37 
 
2.2  Fragmented 
Also in this scenario the urgency of the climate question is recognised, yet at different levels 
in different countries. Hence, little consensus exists on the strictness of the measures that 
should be taken in the various nations and it turns out impossible to make binding 
international agreements. Countries and (within national borders: states, regions, provinces or 
towns), groups of countries, companies and sectors establish their own individual policies – 
without worldwide coordination. This produces a colourful palette of internationally 
FRAGMENTED climate policies. The possible co-benefits of climate policy, in the form of 
security of energy supplies or the mitigation of local environmental problems, play an 
important role in policy designs. 
 
In the USA the federal emphasis is primarily on technology development. Improving the 
security of energy supplies plays an important role. Considerable attention is given to 
biofuels and the improvement of energy efficiency, for example by implementing labels or 
product norms, and by agreements with industry. Internationally, the USA continues to focus 
on the continuation and further extension of technology forums and the Asian Pacific 
Partnership. CDM does not play a role in the USA – not just due to the general lack of 
emissions trading opportunities, but also because CDM does not help to improve the security 
of energy supplies. However, a number of states within the USA is more ambitious than the 
federal government. Some states are introducing emissions trading (e.g. California and 
several northern states), while others establish regulations regarding the minimal share of 
renewable energy or experiment with CO2 capture and storage from coal-fired power plants. 
 
Australia and Canada also focus primarily on technology development. The EU continues the 
system of setting an absolute ceiling with emissions trading, and also Japan remains a 
supporter of this system. The emissions trading systems used by the EU, Japan and a number 
of American states are eventually linked, thus creating a larger market with lower costs. The 
larger and fast-developing countries focus primarily on security of energy supplies and local 
air quality. Specific investments in reducing greenhouse gas emissions only get off the 
ground if they receive funding from other countries or institutions, such as via CDM. 
However, the extent remains limited. When there are no effective agreements between 
countries, initiatives that involve local governments (such as the emissions trading between 
the American states and the EU or Japan) and by the private sector, gain in importance. 
Several sectors make international agreements on emissions reduction, which can be in the 
form of a voluntary emissions ceiling, or agreements on efficiency targets. Since it is not 
reasonable to expect private sectors to succeed in making effective agreements, where policy 
makers have failed to reach these at the national level, the measures at sector level only make 
a modest contribution to emissions reduction. 
 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 13 of 37 
 
The following assumptions are made in order to quantify this scenario. The EU sets an 
emissions ceiling (for the year 2020) that is 15% lower than 1990 emission levels. The 
allocation of emission reductions to Member States is based on emissions per capita. Around 
20% of the emissions reduction is achieved through CDM projects in Latin America, the 
Middle East, China and India. Japan also sets an emissions ceiling – 10% below 1990 
emission levels. Emission allowances are traded freely between the EU and Japan. The 
remaining OECD countries and the Former Soviet Union freeze their emission levels at 2006 
levels via an emissions tax. They do not trade emission allowances and do not use CDM. 
Latin America, the Middle East, China and India succeed in improving their annual energy 
efficiency by 0.5% compared to the baseline scenario. The rest of the world puts no 
restrictions on emissions. Multinational corporations make agreements that lead to energy 
efficiency improvements of 0.15% per year in energy-intensive sectors outside the EU-25, 
compared to the baseline scenario.  
The main assumption in shaping the FRAGMENTED scenario is that USA climate change 
policies are not very restrictive. It then is considered unlikely that other Annex I countries 
will make efforts that go much further than those assumed here (see also section 2.5). 
Table 2.2  FRAGMENTED, 2020 
 Percentage  CO2 reduction  Emission price  National Income
 











emissions 2020  




Annex I  -1 -19 -17 25  -0.3
    EU-25  -15 -32 -27 51  -0.6
    USA  25 -12 -12 14  -0.0
    Former Soviet Union  -25 -7 -7 7  -0.7
    Rest of OECD  3 -25 -20 34  -0.4
Non-Annex I  (147) -- -5 --  0.0
    China  105 -5 -8 2  0.0
    India  203 -5 -7 4  0.0
World  (45) -- -11 --  -0.2
Source: WorldScan 
 
Under the FRAGMENTED scenario global emissions increase by 45% compared to 1990 levels. 
The welfare loss for Annex I countries is, on average, comparable to that of GRAND 
COALITION (-0.3%). Yet, there are considerable differences in welfare impacts amongst 
Annex I countries. For example, costs increase considerably for EU-25 (-0.6%) and within 
the Former Soviet Union (-0.7%), while the USA achieves lower costs (-0.0%) with less Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 14 of 37 
 
effort involved. The extra loss of welfare for the EU-25 is explained by the significantly 
higher emission price (51 €/tCO2 in 2020) due to the limited international availability of 
emission allowances. The loss of welfare in the Former Soviet Union is the result of terms of 
trade losses (due to the lower price of crude oil) and the lack of sales opportunities for ‘hot 
air’. The non-Annex I countries achieve a minimal welfare increase. 
In total, the FRAGMENTED scenario illustrates the major importance of an internationally 
integrated approach: roughly speaking, the macroeconomic costs of climate policy are 
comparable with those of the GRAND COALITION, but the environmental effectiveness is far 
less (45% emissions increase compared to 1990 levels, as against 28% in GRAND 
COALITION). 
2.3  Largest Common Denominator 
This scenario also recognises that global warming is a problem. However, the urgency to find 
a solution is not felt equally amongst the most important stakeholders. There is some 
willingness – also in the USA – to take action, provided this is coordinated multilaterally, 
particularly with respect to the costs and the consequences for competitiveness. In countries 
where the climate problem is seen as more urgent, such as in the EU and Japan, people are 
careful not to get too far ahead of the others. These countries also focus on collaboration. 
Negotiators are prepared to be flexible in one area of international collaboration provided that 
agreements can also be made in other areas. Thus, the USA agrees with new international 
agreements on emissions reduction. The EU accepts that the targets will therefore not be very 
ambitious. The ambition level of the new protocol is determined by the LARGEST COMMON 
DENOMINATOR: the level that is acceptable to everyone. 
 
The Annex I countries participate in this new international protocol, although the targets are 
not very ambitious. Emissions trading is continued (EU-25) or implemented (the USA and 
Canada) and CDM is also continued. The large, fast-growing countries participate in CDM. 
 
The LARGEST COMMON DENOMINATOR scenario is quantified as follows. EU-25 and Japan 
continue to impose the Kyoto targets until 2020. Emission allowances are based on emissions 
per capita. Other Annex I countries implement an emissions ceiling in 2020 that is equal to 
actual emissions in 2006. Within Annex I emission allowances are traded freely, with 10% of 
the reductions in Annex I countries being achieved via CDM in Latin America, the Middle 
East, China and India. 
 
Globally, in 2020, the LARGEST COMMON DENOMINATOR scenario shows emissions 
increasing by 48% (compared to 1990), at an emission price of 18 €/tCO2 for Annex I 
countries. The loss of welfare in Annex I countries amounts at most to 0.3% of national Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 15 of 37 
 
income, while the welfare changes in non-Annex I countries are negligible. Although the 
mitigation targets for Annex I countries are less ambitious than those of the GRAND 
COALITION scenario, actual reductions in Annex I countries are not much lower. If the 
developing countries would also have set targets and participated in emissions trading, as in 
the GRAND COALITION scenario, the mitigation targets for Annex I countries could have been 
far more ambitious without substantially raising their abatement costs. The difference in 
ambition level between the two scenarios is mainly covered by imports of emission 
allowances from the fast-growing developing countries in GRAND COALITION.  
Table 2.3  Largest Common Denominator, 2020 
 Percentage  CO2 reduction  Emission price  National income
 
Target (actual in 
2020) compared 









emissions 2020  




Annex I  1 -17 -16 18  -0.1
    EU-25  -8 -26 -13 18  -0.3
    USA  25 -12 -17 18  -0.0
    Former Soviet Union  -25 -7 -19 18  -0.2
    Rest of OECD  4 -24 -15 18  -0.2
Non-Annex I  (156) -- -1 --  0.0
    China  118 -- -2 --  0.0
    India  221 -- -2 --  0.0
World  (48) -- -9 --  -0.1
Source: WorldScan 
2.4  Impasse 
Despite intensive negotiations, the developed and the larger, fast-developing countries fail to 
achieve post-2012 climate agreements. In particular, the USA, Russia and China do not 
consider global warming an urgent issue. This leads to an IMPASSE, and no follow-up 
agreements are made for the post-2012 period. The USA continues its policy of encouraging 
technology development, and continues to participate in the Asian Pacific Partnership. The 
EU tries internally to keep its emissions trading system alive – in expectation of better times 
at a low ambition level. Thus, it is hoped that later, when climate policy would rank higher on 
the international policy agenda, it will be relatively easy to switch over to stricter emission 
restrictions. CDM remains an option, but will rarely be used with a low CO2 price. The other 
Annex I countries hardly implement climate policies – any policies they put in place are 
integrated where possible into other policy areas, such as those focusing on security of energy Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 16 of 37 
 
supplies and local pollution. Japan, Australia and Canada fall back on the Asian Pacific 
Partnership, where the voluntary agreements have little effect. The developing Asian 
countries also continue to participate in Asian Pacific Partnership. These developing 
countries take no new initiatives, but are prepared to continue with CDM. 
 
IMPASSE is quantified as follows. EU-25 sets an emissions target for 2020 that is 5% lower 
than 1990 emission levels. Emission allowances are allocated according to emissions per 
capita. The remaining OECD countries succeed in reducing their emissions by 0.25% per 
year, compared to the baseline scenario. CDM is not used and there is no trade in emissions 
allowances outside the EU internal market. 
Table 2.4  IMPASSE, 2020 
 













emissions 2020  




Annex I  12 -8 -8 11  -0.2
    EU-25  -5 -24 -24 42  -0.5
    USA  39 -3 -3 2  0.0
    Former Soviet Union  -21 -3 -3 2  -0.4
    Rest of OECD  33 -3 -3 3  0.0
Non-Annex I  (161) -- 0 --  0.0
    China  (123) -- 0 --  0.0
    India  (228) -- 0 --  0.0
World  (56) -- -4 --  -0.1
 Source:  WorldScan 
Under the IMPASSE scenario global emissions increase by 56% compared to 1990 levels. In 
EU-25 an emission price of 42 €/tCO2 applies in 2020 and the loss of welfare amounts to 
0.5% of national income. In this situation there is little point in the EU being more ambitious. 
This is shown by the results of a variant in which the EU ceiling is set at 10% emissions 
reduction compared to 1990 levels (see Figure 2.1). In this case abatement costs increase to 
54 €/tCO2 in 2020, and the welfare loss increases to 0.6% of national income, while the 
impact on global emissions is almost negligible. Partly due to the fact that emitting activities 
migrate to other countries, increased efforts by the EU only lead to an extra reduction of 
worldwide emissions by one percentage point in terms of 1990 emissions. Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 17 of 37 
 
If the EU decides to do the same as the other OECD countries, i.e. -0.25% reduction per year 
compared to the baseline, then emissions by EU-25 Member States will eventually be 21% 
above 1990 levels, at an emission price of only 3 €/tCO2. 
  
 
  Figure 2.1. Variations of the EU target in IMPASSE. Source: WorldScan. 
2.5  Which scenarios provide the highest likelihood of 
achieving the 2°C target? 
Figure 2.2 compares the 2020 greenhouse gas emissions shown by the various scenarios (see 
Table 2.5) with ‘ranges’ of interrelated sets of emission pathways (‘emission envelopes’). 
These emission envelopes show the range within which the emissions for this century must 
remain, in order to achieve the stabilisation levels for greenhouse gases of 450, 550 and 650 
ppm CO2-eq. (Den Elzen et al., 2006).  
The top of the envelope is mainly determined by the fact that further postponement of 
reductions will mean that the intended concentration levels in the atmosphere will no longer 
be feasible. The emission pathways that in the short term (2020-2030) are found at the top of 
the envelope, the so-called ‘delayed response’ pathways, will switch to the bottom of the 
envelope after a period of maximum emission reduction (2% per year for 650 ppm, 2.5% for 
550 ppm, and 3% for 450 ppm). The reverse is true for pathways that start at the bottom of 
the envelope, the so-called ‘early action’ pathways. 
The newly compiled ‘emission envelopes’ show that the need for action is urgent. If the 
world fails to reverse the increase in emissions before 2025 and to let these fall sharply 
afterwards, it will not be possible to achieve low concentration levels within a reasonable 
timeframe. A temperature increase of over 2°C is then very likely. In order to achieve the 2°C Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 18 of 37 
 
target with over 50% certainty (assuming the probabilistic density function for the climate 
sensitivity
1 of Wigley and Raper, 2001), the greenhouse gas concentrations need to be 
stabilised at 450 ppm CO2-eq. (Den Elzen and Meinshausen, 2005). In the long term (2050) 
this means emission reductions of 30-50%, compared to 1990 levels. 
 
  Figure 2.2 Emission reductions of the scenarios compared to the emissions envelopes for stabilisation of 
concentrations, and the chance of achieving the EU climate target, based on Den Elzen et al. (2006). The 
temperature increase is based on an climate sensitivity of 2.5
oC and an uncertainty range of [1.5-4.5]
oC, and is in 
2100 about 1.9
oC [1.1;2.5] for the GRAND COALITION, 2.3
oC [1.4;2.8] for the FRAGMENTED and 2.6
 oC [1.7;3.1] for 
the LARGEST COMMON DENOMINATOR and IMPASSE. Source: FAIR. 
 
For 450 ppm CO2-eq. this study assumed that the concentrations up to 2060 may increase up 
to 500-510 ppm, considering the current high concentrations, and will only stabilise at 450 
ppm after the year 2150. If this type of ‘overshoot’ is not accepted, emission reductions of 
around 70% (compared to 1990 levels) will be necessary in 2050 in order to stabilise 
concentration levels at 450 ppm CO2-eq. (see, for example, Stern, 2006). The Stern Review 
warns for the risks associated with allowing an overshoot, such as the one described here. If 
an overshoot is allowed then the temperature will rise faster and remain high for a longer 
period before starting to fall. Therefore, Stern does not consider any overshoot, and considers 
stabilisation at 500 ppm CO2-eq. the lowest concentration level that is feasible. However, a 
limited overshoot to 500-510 ppm will in the short term not lead to higher temperature 
                                                 
1 Climate sensitivity summarizes the key uncertainties for long-term climate projections and is expressed as the 
expected warming of the earth’s surface for a doubling of pre-industrial CO2 concentrations (2x278=556ppm). 
Several studies have estimated probability density functions (PDFs) for the climate sensitivity. Here, we have 
used the one by Wigley and Raper (2001), which is built to match the conventional IPCC 1.5 to 4.5
oC 
uncertainty range as being a 90% confidence interval of a lognormal PDF. Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 19 of 37 
 
increases than stabilisation at 500 ppm CO2-eq., but the long-term stabilisation at 450 ppm 
leads to lower temperature levels.
2  In the longer term (22
nd century) the temperature effects 
of the overshoot and stabilisation at 450 ppm will be equal.  
                                                 
2 More specifically, the decline of CO2-equivalent concentration after the peak of 500-510 ppm towards a 
stabilisation at 450 ppm avoids a further increase in temperature, which would result from a continued 
stabilization of concentrations at 500 ppm (as Stern assumes). Therefore, our long-term temperature increase for 























GRAND COALITION leads to an increase in fossil CO2 emissions of +28% compared to the 
1990 level. This scenario strongly resembles the 450 ppm CO2-eq. scenario (Den Elzen, et 
al., 2006), which envisages global greenhouse gas emissions (including non-CO2 emissions 
and the CO2 emissions of land use) increasing slightly less – by 22% in 2020.
3 For GRAND 
COALITION, the increase in fossil CO2 emissions (+28%) is translated into a 22% increase in 
global greenhouse gas emissions, as shown in Figure 2.2 and Table 2.5. GRAND COALITION is 
the only scenario that falls within the 450 ppm CO2-eq. envelope, and offers a reasonable 
chance (over 50%) of achieving the EU climate target of a 2°C temperature increase. 
                                                 
3 This is due to the fact that in the short-term the relatively cheap abatement options for some of the non-CO2 gases, lead to more 
non-CO2 emission reductions than CO2 emission reductions. 
Box 1. Emission envelopes 
For the calculation of the emission envelopes this study assumes that global emission 
reductions of more than 2-3% per year are not feasible over a long period, even for the most 
ambitious climate policy. Figure 2.3 shows the 10-year averages for global reduction rates 
of hundreds of global mitigation scenarios using both economic and energy models for the 
period 2010-2100 (thus nine points per scenario, i.e. 2010-2020, 2020-2030,  .. , 2090-
2100). The figure clearly shows that there are few scenarios that exceed the global reduction 
rate of 3% per year. The 650 ppm CO2-eq. category sets the maximum reduction rate at 2%: 
this amounts to 2.5% for 550 ppm and 3% for 450 ppm stabilisation levels. Den Elzen and 
Meinshausen (2006) have used these limits for their calculation of the emission envelopes. 
Each category includes scenarios with faster reduction rates, but most of these are 
exceptions. However, a faster reduction rate would be possible by accelerating the use of 
bioenergy. This would generate maximum global reduction rates of over 5% per year. 
However, the practical feasibility of this option is still unclear. The large-scale cultivation 
of biomass for energy applications could result in a considerable change in future land use, 
and thus endanger the production of sufficient food crops. Current calculations therefore do 














































































































450 ppm   550  ppm 650 ppm Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 21 of 37 
 
Table 2.5  Increase in all greenhouse gases, in relation to the increase in fossil CO2, by scenario, 2020 
  Increase of fossil CO2 
emissions compared to 
1990 levels (%)
Increase of all greenhouse gas emissions 
compared to 1990 level (%)
GRAND COALITION +28 +22
FRAGMENTED +45 +43
LARGEST COMMON DENOMINATOR +48 +45
IMPASSE +56 +52
 
FRAGMENTED leads to a substantial increase in worldwide emissions (+45% CO2 emissions in 
2020 compared to 1990), and only offers a limited chance (34%) (almost ‘unlikely’
4) of 
achieving the 2°C target. The LARGEST COMMON DENOMINATOR scenario leads to slightly 
higher emissions and is unlikely to meet the 2°C objective. 
Would it be possible through enhanced mitigation efforts of the coalition taking on reduction 
commitments to increase this chance of meeting the 2°C target? Under the FRAGMENTED 
scenario, the coalition of Annex I countries that commits itself to mitigation targets consists 
only of the EU and Japan, and these countries will eventually need to achieve reductions that 
are more than 60% (compared to 1990) in order to achieve the 450 ppm target. This is a much 
higher reduction than under the GRAND COALITION scenario (by a factor of 3). This clearly 
shows that even a partial involvement of the USA in the reductions in the coming two 
decades (as assumed in the FRAGMENTED scenario) will lead to ‘unrealistic’ fast and deep 
emission reduction commitments for the EU and the rest of Annex I in order to achieve the 
low stabilization level of 450 ppm. Such deep reductions seem politically, technically and 
economically unfeasible. This study therefore concludes that even if the FRAGMENTED 
assumptions are implemented and that countries take more ambitious policy actions (although 
uncoordinated and without international agreements resulting from a climate protocol), this 
would still not lead to a reasonable chance of achieving the 2°C target. The assumed size of 
the coalition and the intensity of the policy measures determine whether a scenario is 
compatible with the temperature target. It is also doubtful (under the FRAGMENTED scenario) 
whether the EU would take such far-reaching action to reduce emissions, for example from 
the viewpoint of security of energy supplies or local environmental quality. With respect to 
policies concerning the security of energy supplies, it is expected that cost-effective measures 
will clearly be less radical than those for climate policy. In addition, there may be conflicts 
between security of energy supply policies and climate policies, if these lead to greater use of 
‘dirty’ coal. As yet the literature includes little substantiation as to how far countries are 
prepared to go n taking mitigation measures in areas other than climate policy, such as air 
quality or security of energy supplies. The synergy with air quality policy can sometimes be 
considerable, e.g. in East-European countries, China and India. There are very few studies 
focussing on the interactions with policies concerning the security of energy supplies, and 
this subject should be studied further. 
                                                 
4 See IPCC TAR Working Group I Summary for Policymakers: Virtually certain (>99%), very likely (90%-99%), likely (66%-
90%), medium likelihood (33%-66%), unlikely (10%-33%), very unlikely (1%-10%), exceptionally unlikely (<1%). Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 22 of 37 
 
 
The scenario IMPASSE leads to emissions increases in 2020 that are so substantial that limiting 
the temperature increase to 2°C thereafter becomes very unlikely. 
2.6  Which measures are necessary to achieve the 2°C target? 
A recent MNP report (Van Vuuren et al., 2006) establishes the mitigation measures that will 
be required in order to achieve the climate target of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations 
at 450 ppm CO2-eq. In theory, the potential of mitigation measures is large enough to achieve 
emission reductions of up to 60% within the next five decades. The range of mitigation 
measures available is therefore considerable: from nuclear energy to renewable energy 
sources, from saving energy to carbon sinks. Saving energy is thus an important option that, 
certainly over the next few decades, can form an important part of the total mitigation 
package. Reducing emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases is also a very attractive option, 
due to the low costs involved. In the longer term, the transition to carbon-neutral systems 
plays an increasingly greater role. Alongside greater reliance on renewable energy sources or 
nuclear energy, CO2 storage worldwide may become an attractive technology for the future.  
These options serve more than just to address climate change, but they also lead to less 
dependence on fossil fuels, access to advanced ways of using energy sources, better air 
quality (and thus health), as well as to innovative and new market opportunities for industry. 























Figure 2.4 Contributions of global mitigation options in stabilising concentrations at 450 ppm CO2-eq. (Van Vuuren 
et al., 2006). Source: TIMER. 
 
These options are included in simulations using the TIMER model (Van Vuuren et al., 2006). 
The carbon price in this model is clearly higher than the price in comparable WorldScan 
simulations. The higher price of the TIMER model allows more expensive options (such as 
renewable energy) to be used even before 2020. In the WorldScan model, lower emission 
prices mean that most of these options are not viable before 2020. Emission reduction in 
WorldScan occurs because less polluting energy carriers replace the more polluting ones, and 
because fossil energy is replaced by capital, both in production (capital goods) and 
consumption (durable consumption goods), thus reducing energy intensity. 
2.7  Options for the Netherlands 
The opportunities for climate mitigation options in the Netherlands (up to 2020) have 
recently been reviewed (Daniels and Farla, 2006). Their review shows that, in theory, the 
Netherlands has sufficient mitigation options available to achieve a reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions in an order of 5-15% in 2020. A domestic reduction of 15% (compared to 1990 
levels) is possible at a cost of 1-2 bln euro per year. Yet, technically the potential is as high as 
25%. Excluding certain mitigation options leads to higher costs. The review clearly shows 
that achieving a 15% reduction requires considerable policy efforts. 
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In order to remain in line with the global reductions necessary to achieve the 2°C target, the 
Netherlands not only relies on domestic emission mitigation measures, but also uses 
measures outside the country, including CDM projects. The ratio between domestic and 
foreign emission mitigation measures will form an important part of the discussion when 
determining climate policy for the years following 2012. The costs of climate policy will also 
need to be weighed against the co-benefits, such as avoiding the costs of air quality policies. 
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3  Conclusions and discussions 
 
The aforementioned scenarios are meant to sketch possible, alternative developments in the 
climate policy domain of the EU that are relevant for identifying the best mitigation options 
to reduce future greenhouse gas emission, both in the Netherlands and the EU. The 
conclusions arising from this scenario analysis are based on both the simulation outcomes 
using WorldScan (up to the year 2020), and the simulation experiments with the three other 
models: IMAGE, TIMER and FAIR.  
3.1  Conclusions 
Reducing emissions 
The scenario analysis illustrates that only a global approach to address climate change with 
all major countries being involved will achieve substantial long-term greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions that offer a good chance of achieving the EU 2
oC climate target. In 2020 
the fossil CO2 emissions could increase by around 20-30% compared to 1990 levels. A global 
approach would mean that the USA, as well as fast-growing, large developing countries such 
as China, India and Brazil, would be actively reducing their greenhouse gas emissions before 
the year 2020. In the longer term, achieving the 2°C target would require even greater 
mitigation efforts (that lead to 30-50% emissions reduction in 2050, compared to 1990 
levels). 
Only the GRAND COALITION scenario seems compatible with the EU climate target, and this 
scenario assumes that the rich countries will take the lead by achieving greater reductions 
than the developing countries. The developing countries participate in a phased fashion. 
Depending on their level of development, they initially accept relative reduction targets, 
followed by absolute reduction targets. All these reduction targets are technically feasible – 
using existing, available mitigation measures. The scenarios FRAGMENTED and LARGEST 
COMMON DENOMINATOR achieve rather limited reductions in the worldwide growth of 
emissions. It is unlikely that these scenarios will eventually be compatible with the 2°C 
temperature target. In the IMPASSE scenario the rise of emissions up to 2020 is so substantial 
that it becomes very unlikely that the temperature increase can be limited to 2°C. 
Costs 
Using worldwide emissions trading the reduction costs in 2020 for industrialised countries 
can be limited to 0.3% of national income, at an emission price of 24 €/tCO2. The costs per 
region may vary, and partly depend on the way in which emission allowances are allocated. If 
the allocation of emission reductions is based on countries’ emissions per capita, then 
industrialised nations will bear relatively high costs. The costs to developing countries will be 
relatively modest, and they may benefit from the export of emission permits. Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 26 of 37 
 
 
Stricter mitigation targets and a smaller coalition will both lead to increased costs. A scenario 
whereby a small coalition contributes to a relatively low global emissions reduction can be 
relatively more expensive than a scenario whereby a large coalition contributes to a relatively 
high worldwide emissions reduction. Thus the costs in 2020 for the EU under the 











Figure 3.1 Percentage changes in national income, by scenario and region, 2020. Source: WorldScan. 
 
Relative targets 
In a number of scenarios (including FRAGMENTED) it is assumed that, during the period 
given, there is no support for a global coalition or absolute CO2 reduction targets. Relative 
targets to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of economic production have the advantage 
that they offer more certainty about the expected costs involved. However, the disadvantage 
is that they offer less certainty with respect to environmental effectiveness. 
Emissions trading and CDM 
Emissions trading plays a role in all scenarios, although to a varying extent. It makes policies 
particularly cost-effective, regardless of how emission allowances are allocated. For example, 
GRAND COALITION achieves a much lower level of greenhouse gas emissions than 
FRAGMENTED. Yet, the costs are very similar. Under the IMPASSE scenario a European trading 
system is maintained at limited costs (0.5% of national income in 2020). A higher EU 
ambition level would increase costs further, without substantial benefits in terms of 
worldwide emissions reduction. Some scenarios reflect that some parts of the world do not Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 27 of 37 
 
participate in a mandatory regime. In incomplete coalitions, CDM can reduce the costs of 
climate policy by making use of relatively inexpensive reduction options elsewhere. 
However, CDM also has some disadvantages (see ‘Discussion’). 
 
Consequences of lower environmental effectiveness 
Three of the four specified scenarios have an outcome showing that the EU target (2°C 
temperature increase) cannot be achieved. Emissions under LARGEST COMMON 
DENOMINATOR and IMPASSE are very similar to those of the baseline scenario, therefore these 
scenarios will probably lead to greenhouse gas concentrations of over 900 ppm CO2-eq. in 
2100, and to a rise in temperature of 3.7°C compared to pre-industrial levels (climate 
sensitivity of 2.5°C). After 2100 the temperature will continue to rise for many years. Only 
the GRAND COALITION scenario offers a reasonable chance of achieving the 2°C target. Under 
the FRAGMENTED scenario, future emissions eventually lead to concentration levels of around 
650 ppm CO2-eq. in 2100, and thus to a long-term temperature increase of around 2.3°C 
compared to pre-industrial levels. Even though FRAGMENTED assumes that countries 
implement a more ambitious policy (without international coordination and commitments), 
this policy would still not lead to a reasonable chance of achieving the 2°C target. In 2020 the 
EU countries and Japan would need to reduce their emissions by over 60% (compared to 
1990 levels) to gain a real chance of achieving the 2°C target. 
3.2  Discussion 
We would also like to mention the following points that seem to be relevant to the policy 
debate, although they can not directly be derived from the aforementioned scenarios. 
 
Sector-based targets 
A possible alternative is to set worldwide targets per sector, for example based on the best 
performance in the industry (‘benchmarking’, or sectoral targets). Such sector-based 
transnational agreements with developing countries could be attractive, in particular in 
helping to maintain a level playing field for globally competitive industrial sectors. The main 
difference between relative and absolute targets is the implicit distribution of the costs. Under 
a relative system the costs are mostly borne by countries with a low energy productivity level. 
 
Technology 
Strengthening technology development and dissemination can be an important factor within 
the climate protocol, for example in accommodating participation of the USA and other 
countries such as Japan. Developing countries are interested in agreements concerning ‘clean’ 
developments and technology transfer. However, R&D alone is not enough to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions sufficiently to bring the climate target within reach. ‘Push’ alone is Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 28 of 37 
 
not enough. It is just as important to introduce the ‘pull’ via a market where a specific price is 
attached to CO2.  A lack of ‘pull’ makes adoption and development of new technologies 
much less probable (De Coninck et al., 2006). 
 
Leakage effects of CDM 
CDM is less effective than emissions trading in a regime with absolute caps. Leakage effects 
of around 10-40% are possible (Bollen et al., 2005). Revenues from CDM projects can lead 
to price reductions in the sector where CDM is applied. This may induce extra demand and 
an upward pressure on emissions. On local energy markets, reducing the demand for energy 
may result in lower energy prices. In addition, difficulties in monitoring the baseline and 
reduction efforts result in high transaction costs. A first recommendation arising from these 
analyses would be to use CDM merely as a transitional measure, to prepare developing 
countries for complete participation in a climate regime. A second recommendation would be 
to guard against high leakage effects when investing in the energy sector. 
 
Security of energy supplies 
There are important synergy effects between measures that limit climate change and those 
that improve the security of energy supply. Measures that lead to reduced CO2 emissions 
(energy savings, renewables, nuclear energy) generally also reduce dependence on oil and gas 
imports. But not always: CO2 capture and storage only improves the security of supply if it 
also results in an increased use of coal. Replacing coal with gas is good for emissions, but 
bad for a country’s dependence on natural gas imports. Emissions trading within a broad 
coalition only leads to limited domestic effort: the energy system changes little, as does the 
dependence on imports. Vice versa, measures that specifically improve the security of energy 
supplies do not always have a positive effect on emissions. Leaning more heavily on coal 
usage may limit gas imports, but will in general also increase emissions.  
 
How robust are these results? 
Several explanatory remarks are needed with respect to the cost estimates. The adjustment 
costs of economic restructuring (temporary and local unemployment, accelerated depreciation 
of capital goods etc.) are neglected in the calculations. Stricter environmental policies render 
past investments less profitable and require a number of adjustments in both human and 
physical capital. Higher energy costs lead to a reduction in real wages. Wage rigidity can lead 
to (temporary) unemployment. 
Monopolistic market behaviour can also lead to higher costs. Emissions markets are assumed 
to work perfectly, but in reality there may be a limited number of suppliers exerting market 
power. For example, this would apply to a country like Russia, when it would possess large 
quantities of hot air in a small coalition. CDM project suppliers may also display Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 29 of 37 
 
monopolistic behaviour, so that the CDM price comes closer to the emission price on the 
emission market than would be the case in more competitive circumstances. 
The WorldScan analysis only takes account of fossil energy related CO2 emissions, while 
other (possibly less expensive) mitigation options fall outside the scope of the analysis. 
Reducing emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse gases may reduce costs in the medium term. In 
addition, carbon storage and sequestration is not included as an option. 
Costs depend on the underlying scenario used. A scenario with higher economic growth leads 
– in the baseline scenario – to higher emissions, and requires greater reductions in order to 
achieve certain (absolute) levels (Bollen et al., 2004). Varying trade barriers and transport 
costs in scenarios may also affect the substitution possibilities in the regions distinguished. 
Reduced substitution possibilities make climate policy more expensive. 
Costs are given for the year 2020, a rather arbitrary moment in time. These costs do not 
denote a structural long-term impact. It is important to remember that, over the course of 
time, the mitigation efforts will increase further and the costs will rise accordingly. Previous 
simulations to realise the 2°C target assess costs to amount to several percents of global GDP 
in 2040 (Bollen et al., 2004). 
Models always produce incomplete pictures of reality. Different models therefore also 
produce different results. For example, Van Vuuren et al. (2006), using the TIMER model, 
arrived at an emission price of 50 €/tCO2 for GRAND COALITION (the 450 ppm scenario). 
TIMER aims to present an overview of the usage of the available technical opportunities for 
emissions reduction. Using comparable reduction targets and the same baseline scenario, the 
WorldScan model results in a lower emission price of 24 €/tCO2. This model focuses on 
showing the economic substitution processes that are set in motion when greenhouse gas 
emissions are ‘priced’. TIMER takes account of the slow responses of the energy system: it 
takes time to switch over to cleaner energy carriers. WorldScan does not take explicit account 
of modification paths, and simply sketches a long-term outcome. The two models have 
different characteristics (technical versus economic orientation, dynamic short-term versus 
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Appendix A: Characteristics of the models used and of 
the baseline scenario 
A.1 WorldScan 
The quantitative, economic characteristics of the various scenarios are based on simulation 
outcomes from WorldScan (Lejour et al., 2006), which is a general equilibrium  model for the 
world economy. This model was developed in the 1990s for scenario construction and is 
often used for scenario studies and for all kinds of policy studies, also in the field of global 
warming (see, for example, Bollen et al., 2004, and Bollen et al., 2005). The model is based 
on neo-classical theory and shows the outcome of microeconomic behaviour of the agents, 
subject to balance conditions and additional restrictions. In establishing an equilibrium for the 
global economy, the welfare of the various consumers is maximised and all balance equations 
and eventual policy restrictions (such as CO2 emission ceilings) are met. 
General equilibrium models generally take account of the interdependencies between 
individual markets for various goods and production factors. It is usually assumed that there 
are no frictions in these markets, so that each of the production factors is fully utilised. In 
addition, the use of production factors can be immediately reallocated across the various 
sectors. This means that the model outcomes for the policy scenarios can be seen as ‘long-
term’ reactions to the policy used: the costs of restructuring and modifications in the medium 
term are not taken into account. Supply, demand and trade are modelled in WorldScan as 
follows. 
Supply 
Potential production is determined for each region by the availability of primary production 
factors. WorldScan differentiates between labour, capital, natural resources and technology. 
The supply of labour is exogenous, and is based on projections of participation levels for 
various demographic cohorts. International capital mobility is incomplete. The capital goods 
available depend on both the investment opportunities and national savings. The availability 
of natural resources and the speed of technical progress are exogenous. The simulations take 
account of the fact that developing countries can learn from the rich nations. Across the globe 
there is some convergence of total productivity. However, at the sectoral level the rate of 
productivity expansion varies considerably – in accordance with historic patterns.  
Demand 
The demand for goods and services shifts over the course of time. The demand for services 
becomes relatively more important than that for manufactured or agricultural products. This 
shift in demand is the result of varying income elasticities and varying developments of 
relative prices – which partially depend on sectoral growth differences. National savings rates 
depend on the demographic structure – according to empirical estimates. 
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Domestic market tensions between supply and demand can be partially relieved by 
international trade. However, trade opportunities are limited. Goods and services from 
different origins are not fully substitutable (the Armington assumption). International trade is 
made more difficult by transport costs, trade tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
 
Table A.1  Overview of regions, sectors and production inputs (WorldScan) 
Regions Sectors  Inputs 
    
Germany Agriculture  Factors: 
France  Minerals    Low-educated workers 
UK  Oil    Well-educated workers 
Italy  Coal    Capital 
Spain  Oil refinery products    Fixed factor 
The Netherlands  Natural gas   
Other EU-15  Electricity  Energy carriers: 
New Member States  Energy-intensive products    Coal 
Other European countries  Chemicals    Oil refinery products 
Turkey  Consumer goods    Natural gas 
USA  Capital goods    Commercial biomass 
Canada  Transport    Renewable energy sources 
Australia Other  services   
Other OECD countries    Other intermediary inputs: 
Former Soviet Union      Agriculture 
China      Minerals 
India      Oil 
Brazil      Electricity 
Other Latin America      Energy-intensive products 
Middle East and North Africa      Chemicals 
Rest of the world      Consumer goods 
      Capital goods 
      Transport 
      Other services 
 
WorldScan takes its data for the base year (2001) from the GTAP-6 database (Dimanaran and 
McDougall, 2006), which contains integrated data of bilateral trade flows and input-output 
data for 57 sectors and 87 countries (or groups of countries). The WorldScan version used for 
this scenario study distinguishes thirteen markets for goods and services, one labour market 
and a capital market for each of the 21 countries and regions shown in Table A.1. Five 
different primary energy carriers are distinguished: coal, oil refinery products, natural gas, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 34 of 37 
 
commercial biomass and renewable energy. Only the first three of these contribute to the CO2 
emissions generated by the model. 
A.2 Allocating emission allowances within coalitions 
Under the aforementioned scenarios, emission allowances are allocated to coalition partners 
based on emissions per capita. Countries with a relatively high emission-per-capita level 
therefore have a relatively heavy reduction target. If  i
t e  is the emission volume of coalition 
member i in year t and  i















μ    (A.1) 
is the share of country i in the intended emission reduction  t r of the total coalition. Suppose 
that the intended reduction in target year  e t is a certain fraction 
e t ρ  of the emissions in the 
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and that the reduction path is started immediately after year  s t . There is therefore a transition 
period of  s e t t − = τ  years during which the reduction target is gradually achieved. Over this 
period the emission allowances  i
t e  are allocated to coalition members as follows:  
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Note that with (A.3) the coalition achieves exactly the reduction target of the target year. 
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In the scenarios the triple ( e s t t t , , 0 ) takes the value (1990, 2010, 2020).  
A.3 IMAGE, TIMER and FAIR 
Three integrated models were used to calculate the emission envelopes (see Section 2.5): the 
‘integrated assessment model’ IMAGE 2.3 (IMAGE team, 2001), the energy system model 
TIMER (Van Vuuren et al., 2006) and the climate policy model FAIR (Den Elzen and Lucas, 
2005). The calculations were performed in three steps: 
1.  The first step involves constructing a baseline scenario for future greenhouse gas 
emissions, using the IMAGE and TIMER models. The TIMER model also yields the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP)  page 35 of 37 
 
availability of mitigation options and the associated mitigation costs, while the 
IMAGE model provides options and costs for the land-related sources, including 
biomass.  
2.  The second step involves using the FAIR model to produce ‘envelopes’ of emission 
reductions (groups of feasible emission pathways) that match the stabilisation targets 
for concentration levels (450, 550 and 650 ppm CO2-eq.) (Den Elzen and 
Meinshausen, 2005). Within these envelopes a set of measures was sought that would 
result in the ‘least expensive’ global emission pathway for the various regions, sectors 
and greenhouse gases. Climate calculations were made using a simple climate model: 
MAGICC 4.1. 
3.  Finally, IMAGE and TIMER produce the specific eventual mitigation scenario 
(emissions, land use and energy system) with emission levels and the international 
market price of emissions allowances, as determined in the previous phase. 
When determining the reduction envelopes it was assumed that, due to technical limitations, 
the worldwide reduction rate would not be higher than 2-3% per year (see box of Section 
2.5). When defining the set of measures no limitations were put on using reduction options in 
the various sectors, greenhouse gases and regions. In theory this might be rather optimistic as 
far as the costs are concerned. Limiting the use of measures per sector can lead to 
considerably higher costs, in particular if some of the relatively cheap non-CO2 reduction 
options are excluded. 
All calculations using IMAGE, TIMER and FAIR distinguish 17 regions. The targets can be 
achieved not just by utilising measures within the region, but also through emission 
reductions elsewhere. Emissions trading systems allow these reductions to be traded between 
the different regions. In total, the models used provide insight into the chances of achieving 
the 2°C temperature target, the contribution made by the various measures, and the (regional) 
costs, assuming that the measures can be realised in all regions. The costs involved refer only 
to the direct costs of the climate policy. Additional costs, such as restructuring costs or loss of 
fossil fuel exports, are not included in these calculations. On the other hand, additional co-
benefits (such as lower costs for air pollution policy) are also excluded from this study. 
A.4 Baseline scenario 
All analyses are based on a so-called middle-course scenario without climate policy, which 
has been developed by MNP (Van Vuuren et al., 2006). This scenario is based on estimates 
of trends, and is comparable to the reference scenario used by the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) and the so-called B2 scenario used by the IPCC. According to this baseline 
scenario, the global population will continue to expand to 9-10 bln in the middle of this 
century, and decrease slightly thereafter. Combined with a worldwide economic growth of 
around 2% per year, the global demand for energy will increase significantly: doubling 
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in the nations currently known as developing countries, which will thus partially reduce the 
gap in energy consumption per capital with the industrialized countries.  
 
Table A.2    Data for base year, 2001 




intensity CO2 intensity 
 (million)  (billion  $)  (Mtoe) (GtCO2) (USA=100) (USA=100) 
Annex I  1271 24575  5398 13.78 107 96 
    EU-25  453 8261  1503 3.73 88 93 
    USA  288 10085  2076 5.52 100 100 
    Former Soviet 
Union 
282 415  868 2.13 1017 92 
    Rest  of OECD  248 5815  951 2.40 79 95 
Non-Annex I  4796 6703  3168 8.97 230 107 
    China  1292 1332  974 3.17 355 122 
    India  1033 478  311 0.98 316 118 
World  6067 31279  8566 22.75 133 100 
a) Total of coal, refinery products, natural gas, commercial biomass and renewable energy  
Source: WorldScan 
 
Without climate policy it would be primarily the fossil fuels that meet the energy demand and 
CO2 emissions would increase accordingly. In the baseline scenario the total greenhouse gas 
emissions increase from around 30 bln tons (=Gt) CO2-eq. in the year 2000 to some 50 bln 
tons in 2050, and 70 bln tons in 2100. The projections from other (alternative) baseline 
scenarios are sometimes higher and sometimes lower (between 40 and 90 bln tons).  Fossil 
CO2 emissions increase in the baseline scenario from almost 23 GtCO2 in 2001, to around   
34 GtCO2 in 2020 (see Tables A.2 and A.3). Although historically the total greenhouse gas 
emissions were largely caused by the rich nations (around 80%), just as with energy 
consumption growth, the growth in emissions is now greatest in developing countries: their 
share in global emissions increases from around 50% (current levels) to 65% in 2100. 
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Table A.3     Characteristics of baseline scenario, average annual growth, 2001-2020 





 %  %  % % % %
Annex I  0.2 2.6  1.4 1.2 -1.2 -0.2
    EU-25  0.0 2.3  1.4 1.2 -0.9 -0.2
    USA  0.9 3.0  1.2 1.1 -1.7 -0.1
    Former Soviet Union  -0.2 5.5  1.8 1.5 -3.5 -0.3
    Rest of OECD  0.1 2.1  1.4 1.1 -0.7 -0.2
Non-Annex I  1.3 5.0  3.3 3.0 -1.7 -0.3
    China  0.6 7.4  2.7 2.4 -4.4 -0.3
    India  1.5 5.8  3.6 3.4 -2.1 0.2
World  1.1 3.2  2.2 2.0 -1.0 -0.2
Source: WorldScan 
 
This trend is also visible for fossil-based CO2 emissions over the period 2001-2020. Although 
the contribution by non-Annex I countries to worldwide emissions amounted to around 40% 
in 2001 (see Table A.2), this appears to increase to over 48% in 2020 (according to         
Table A.3). Emissions per capita in the current OECD countries remain higher than those of 
developing countries. Compared to current levels (around 425 ppm CO2-eq.) the greenhouse 
gas concentration in the baseline scenario rises to more than double in 2100 (above 900 ppm 
CO2-eq.) and continues to increase thereafter. At an average estimate of climate sensitivity 
(2.6°C), the temperature increase in 2100 will be 3.7°C (Den Elzen et al., 2006b). 